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Abstract 
This paper studies the determinants of Chinese households’ saving. Domestic saving in 
China is the highest in the world in terms of GDP and it is mirrored in a large and persistent 
current account surplus. First, we show that notwithstanding the rising contribution of 
government and firms to national savings, they stand out because of households’ behaviour. 
Our econometric analysis proceeds from the work of Modigliani and Cao (2004) that 
explained rising personal saving in China within the life-cycle hypothesis. We prove that 
their explanation is insufficient. Then, using panel data and exploiting differences among 
provinces and between urban and rural households, we show that there is a significant 
dissimilarity in savings decisions in urban and rural areas and that motives other than those 
envisaged in the life-cycle model might play a major role, above all precautionary savings 
and liquidity constraints. Our results suggest that to reduce the propensity to save of Chinese 
households it is necessary to improve the provision of social services and to facilitate access 
to credit.  
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1. Introduction 
Domestic savings in China reached 50 per cent of national income in 2008, the highest level 
in the world as a share of GDP. Savings  have  been rising over the  last decade, systematically 
exceeding investment expenditures, notwithstanding the quite sharp surge of the latter as a share of 
GDP, from 35 per cent in 2000 to 45 per cent in 2009. This widening discrepancy translated into 
large current account surpluses in China, mirrored by large deficits in advanced countries.
1 Private 
consumption, on the other hand, fell as a share of GDP, from 46.2 to 34.5 per cent over the same 
period, as a result of a rising propensity to save and a persistent erosion of households’ disposable 
income.  
The rising share of China in world GDP (to 11.4 per cent from 7.2 in 2000
2) and weaker 
growth prospects  for advanced  countries are already creating tensions  in currency  markets and 
international fora. A perpetuation of the old growth pattern whereby the excess production of China 
is absorbed by the US and other advanced economies running widening current account deficits is 
not sustainable. Understanding the saving determinants in China has thus become a central issue in 
the debate on global imbalances (Bernanke, 2005, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009).  
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2006) proposed a “three handed approach” to rebalance growth in 
China which would entail “a decrease in saving, with a focus on private saving, an increase in the 
supply of services, in particular health services, and an appreciation of the renminbi”. The actual 
quantitative  effect  of  this  and  similar  policy  recommendations,
3  aimed  at  stimulating  Chinese 
consumption, has been disputed. Zhang and co-authors
4 argued that the impact of a reduction of 
Chinese current account surplus engineered through a change in China’s saving behaviour would 
have almost negligible effects on rebalancing world demand and the current accounts in deficits 
countries.  The  Chinese  Government  has  anyhow  recently  recognised  in  its  12
th  five-year  plan 
(2011-16), that promoting a more balanced growth within China and increasing the welfare of the 
population by sustaining domestic consumption are qualifying aspects of its medium-term policy. 
No matter whether one believes that a rebalancing of demand in China will guide the world 
toward a more sustainable growth path or rather dismiss this argument and judges such a policy 
useful for China’s own sake, the issue of Chinese saving is central to the national and international 
economic policy debate.  
So why are savings in China so high and where does the problem lie: with households, firms 
or Government? 
                                                 
1 Over the last decade China’s current account surplus increased six folds as a percentage of GDP peaking at 11 per cent in 2007, 
about 372 billion dollars. In 2008 that surplus amounted roughly at 50 per cent of the aggregated surpluses of the rest of Asia 
(including Japan) and the major oil exporting countries. Foreign reserves rose rapidly, reaching 2.4 trillion dollars at the end of last 
year (more than half of China’s GDP). 
2 At the PPP. 
3 See also Blanchard (2009), Krugman (2010) and IMF (2009). 
4 Zhang et al. (2010).   6 
All  three  institutional  sectors  (government,  households  and  corporate)  are  big  savers  in 
China. But while the corporate sector behaviour is not unusual, especially when compared with 
other Asian economies, and net savings are negative, the households sector propensity to save is the 
highest in the world and kept rising over the last few years. As we will argue, this is partly due to 
the Government budget policies, that kept government consumption low as a share of GDP as the 
soaring revenues were invested in infrastructures or transferred to firms capital accounts. So it is on 
personal saving that we will focus our analysis.
5 
Chinese households savings increased dramatically from the end of the seventies, after the 
introduction of economic reforms. Before 1979 China was a planned economy characterized by full 
employment and consumer goods shortages; government provided housing, education, pensions and 
medical services; households savings were essentially due to unsatisfied consumption rather than 
the result of wealth accumulation decisions. The social protection network (known as the iron rice 
bowl) has been progressively dismantled as economic reforms proceeded distributing unevenly the 
profits  of  the  resulting  fast  growth.  Strict  family  planning  policies  were  enforced  (“one  child 
policy”), provoking dramatic changes in the demographic structure of the population and in the 
intergenerational relationships as children in the traditional Chinese society were the future source 
of income for the elders. The household registration system (hukou), by restricting migration from 
the countryside to urban areas, has prevented a more balanced development, maintaining a dual-
economy.
6 The system of state owned enterprises (SOEs) has been gradually put aside, as private 
businesses started flourishing in economic “special zones” and spreading from there. 
All these factors have contributed to the sharp rise of Chinese personal savings from around 
5 per cent of disposable income before 1978 to almost 40 per cent in 2009. 
The life cycle theory, first formalized by Modigliani and Brumberg,
7 still constitutes the 
workhorse of the theoretical  literature on savings.
8 It states that people maximize their lifetime 
utility and choose – under standard hypothesis – a smooth consumption pattern, which entails that, 
facing a reduction of their income after retirement, they will build up assets during their working 
life to finance consumption after retirement. Demography and growth are the main determinant of 
aggregate saving in the standard version of the model.
9 Modigliani and Cao tested the life cycle 
explanation with Chinese aggregate data spanning almost 50 years (1953-2000), concluding that the 
theory fits the data well.  
                                                 
5 Similar conclusion on the centrality of personal savings are reached – among others – by Chamon & Prasad (2010), Horioka and 
Wan (2007) and Wei & Zhang (2009). 
6 On the functioning of the hukou system see Wang (1997). 
7 Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). 
8 Browning and Lusardi (1996) reviewing the literature lists nine possible motives that can induce people to save (eight of which 
already envisaged by Keynes in the General Theory) and focus on a “standard model” that captures the basic insights of the LCH. 
9 There is some ambiguity in the literature concerning what people really mean by life cycle model, see Browning and Lusardi 
(1996). Here we mean the simple life cycle model with certainty equivalence or the “stripped down version” of the model (see 
Deaton 1992).   7 
Their evidence has been indirectly called into question by results based on provincial level 
data by Horioka and Wan (2007) and household level data by Chamon and Prasad (2010) and by 
Brugiavini et al (2010). Differences between rural and urban  households  behaviour and the U-
shaped age profile of savings are hard to reconcile with the standard version of the life cycle model 
and are at odds with Modigliani and Cao conclusions. 
Difficulties  in  rationalizing  empirical  facts  concerning  saving  behaviour  with  economic 
theory are well known and by no means unique to China. Recognizing this problem most empirical 
analysis  usually  starts  with  an  a-theoretical  specification,
10  while  the  theoretical  literature  has 
proposed several explanations to help bridge this gap. Prominent among them are the presence of 
liquidity constraints that prevent agents from keeping the marginal utility of consumption constant 
over their lifetime posing a binding constraint on their possibilities to borrow against future income 
and  precautionary  saving  arising  from  uncertain  future  income  prospects  in  the  presence  of  a 
convex marginal utility. 
The deep changes occurred in China over the last thirty years have surely radically increased 
the amount of uncertainty families face concerning their incomes and pensions, so together with 
liquidity constraints it is highly likely that people are induced to save also for precautionary reasons. 
In a recent speech, the Governor of the People’s Bank of China addressed the issue of high Chinese 
savings  considering  first  a  cultural  argument,  “East  Asian  countries  are  influenced  by 
Confucianism, which values thrift, self-discipline, zhong yong or Middle Ground (low-key)” but 
ultimately concluding that “under the planned economy, housing, healthcare, and pension were 
provided by the enterprises and the government… After the reform in the 1990s, the “iron bowl” 
(lifelong secure job and welfare) system was smashed … However, effective social security system 
had  not  been  in  place  either.  These  significantly  increased  the  incentive  for  precautionary 
savings.”
11 
We take stock of this debate and revisit the results of Modigliani and Cao. We conclude that 
the life cycle explanation is less robust than what previously believed. Recent data show that the 
rise in personal saving rates occurred mainly among urban households leaving rural savings quite 
unchanged (as a share of disposable income). We therefore split aggregate time series (updated to 
2008) distinguishing between rural and urban households and find clear evidence of different saving 
patterns.  This  evidence  calls  into  question  the  “one  size  fits  all”  assumption  implicit  in  the 
aggregate analysis, hence we focus on provincial level data, to exploit the variation across provinces 
as well as among rural and urban realities, taking into account in this way the uneven pace of 
development of Mainland China. Our results underscore the importance of modelling the saving 
behaviour  of  urban  and  rural  households  differently  and  shed  some  doubts  on  the  attempts  at 
explaining Chinese personal savings only through country-wide factors. 
                                                 
10 “most of the empirical work on saving itself is descriptive and relatively atheoretical” (Browning & Lusardi, 1996). See for 
example Loayza et al. (2000). 
11 Xiaochuan (2009).   8 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we address the general question of whether 
China  is  saving  too  much,  analyzing  the  different  dimensions  along  which  this  might  be  a 
meaningful question. In section 3 we give a closer look at aggregate data to prove that the main 
cause of high savings lies in the household sector. In section 4 we assess the life cycle explanation 
of  Chinese  high  personal  savings  first  advanced  by  Modigliani  and  Cao  to  conclude  it  is  not 
satisfactory  from  various  points  of  view.  In  section  5  we  propose  alternative  explanations  and 
exploit the variability across Chinese provinces to gauge them. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A 
provides details on data sources, data constructions and discrepancies between national accounts 
and survey statistics. 
 
2. Is China’s savings rate too high? 
China’s savings are very high in more than one respect: comparing them with those of other 
countries  in  general,  with  those  of  East  Asian  economies  in  particular  and  with  countries  in  a 
similar development stage. Savings are high also with respect to the past, as they kept increasing till 
the most recent years and, finally, their level is “high” also considering the sustainability of excess 
saving (and hence current account surplus) over the medium term. 
International  comparisons of saving rates are notoriously  insidious:  large gaps  in  saving 
behaviour across countries might be substantially reduced once relevant differences in accounting 
procedures and concepts are considered (see Hayashi, 1989, for a convincing case concerning US 
and Japan) and various definitions of “saving” can lead to different conclusions (‘net’ or ‘gross’ 
saving rates, domestic, private or household savings, see OECD, 2004). The poor quality of the data 
also hinders the comparison, especially in the early phases of development when a coherent system 
of accounts is often not available. With this caveat in mind, in what follows we will rely mainly on 
international sources and use “gross” saving rates (i.e. inclusive of depreciation) in cross-country 
comparisons. 
As shown in the first column of Table 1, gross domestic savings in China are much higher 
than those recorded in the rest of the world. This was already true at the beginning of the nineties, it 
became more striking by the end of this decade.  
Even focusing only on the other East Asian countries (top part of Table 1) where savings are 
traditionally high, partly for cultural reasons,
12 China stands out with national savings that are 20 
points (of GDP) higher than Korea, Indonesia and Vietnam, 15 points higher than India and 25 
points more than Japan. The other striking feature that emerges from the data, is the very low level 
of consumption in terms of GDP, compared with all other countries (column 3). 
China is an outlier also considering private saving (i.e. domestic savings minus government 
savings). Over the period 2002-2008 on average the Chinese private sector saved 7 percentage 
                                                 
12 See among other Morishima (1982) for Japan and the Governor of PBofC, Zhou Xiaochuan (2009) for China.   9 
points of GDP more than the thriftiest country in the sample, India. It was also well above the others 
in terms of capital accumulation, with a share of investment in GDP greater than 42 per cent, that 
compares with rates in the mid thirties or mid twenties for most other Asian economies. 
 
Table 1. International comparison of domestic saving, domestic absorption 
and current account balance 






consumption  Gross capital 
formation        
Current account 
balance
China 50.2 8.2 38.1 42.7 7.6
India 37.0 2.1 57.6 34.4 -0.7
Indonesia 27.8 4.8 64.0 25.4 1.7
Korea, Rep. 31.1 10.2 54.5 29.9 1.2
Thailand 29.2 6.2 56.0 27.5 1.8
Vietnam 32.4 7.3 65.2 38.2 -5.7
Japan 27.0 3.9 57.2 23.4 3.6
Brazil 17.7 -1.6 60.5 17.5 0.1
Russian Federation 31.0 10.0 49.1 22.9 7.9
France 20.4 5.3 56.7 20.6 -0.4
Germany 22.7 0.3 58.2 17.7 5.2
Italy 19.2 0.5 58.6 21.1 -2.0
United Kingdom 15.0 3.9 64.6 17.3 -2.3
United States 14.5 10.2 69.9 19.4 -5.2
2002-2008 average
Country
Source: IMF, WEO April 2010. 
 
One  might object that this comparison  is  flawed since we are dealing with countries at 
different stages of development (see Appendix, Table A1). In Table 2 we consider various Asian 
economies in their take-off phase, defined as a period of prolonged and sustained growth (see also 
Bank of Italy, 2003). We focused on a set of Asian economies that started their rapid expansion at 
relatively low (and similar) level of per capita GDP, ending them with levels twice as high or more. 
This comparison confirms the exceptional amount of income saved by the Chinese.
13  
                                                 
13 Data availability imposed a limitation on the scope of the comparison. The “take-off phases” were selected via inspection of the 
data on growth, however the results are robust with respect to small variations in the time periods selected.   10 
Table 2. Comparison of growth, savings and investment performance over the take-off period 




Per capita GDP 
at beginning of 
period                
($ PPP)
Per capita GDP 




National Savings               
(% of GDP)
Investment               
(% of GDP)
China 1999-2008 2162 6188 10.4 47.6 38.8
India 1999-2009 1447 2868 7.0 30.4 28.1
Indonesia 1988-1996 1269 2450 7.3 32.0 24.1
Malaysia 1988-1996 4037 8239 9.4 32.7 37.9
Thailand 1988-1996 2207 5018 9.0 33.8 39.5  
Source: IMF, WEO April 2010. 
Is the current situation sustainable in the long run? There are at least two arguments that can 
be put forward to argue that the answer should be “no”. First, since according to most predictions in 
deficit countries demand is likely to remain much weaker than in the pre-crisis era “for surplus 
economies… the challenge is to rebalance growth from external sources to domestic sources and 
run smaller surpluses in the future” (IMF, 2010). Second, even if the world were to return to the 
previous situation the question is: could in that case the rising level of Chinese savings and exports 
be absorbed? Growing at an average annual rate of 10 per cent by 2020 China would outweigh 
Japan in terms of GDP not only at the PPP but also in dollar term. Chinese GDP would account for 
roughly 1/6 of world total output and its savings therefore (if stable at more than 50 per cent of 
GDP) would rise from little more than 4 per cent to 8 per cent of world GDP. A 10 per cent surplus 
in net exports would translate in a twice as big rest of the world deficit compared with 2009. It 
seems highly unlikely that such a growing burden in deficit countries can be financed without rising 
stability risks.  
 
3. China’s savings by sector  
The scenario depicted at the end of last section, is not only unfeasible from a global point of 
view, it is also undesirable for China itself. The growth strategy pursued so far with undisputable 
success by the Chinese authorities entailed the rapid accumulation of physical capital (machinery 
and infrastructures) through an intensive plan of public and private investments financed by fast 
rising  domestic  savings.  As  productivity  rose,  output,  firms’  profits  and  government  revenues 
expanded. On the other hand, the labour share contracted in terms of GDP since wages grew at a 
slower pace, bringing households’ disposable income down to 58 per cent of GDP in 2008, from 69 
per cent at the beginning of the previous decade.  
Starting from the early nineties capital accumulation has taken place at the expense of 
private consumption: as a share of GDP, gross fixed capital formation rose from 30 per cent to 45 
per  cent,  while  private  consumption  shrank  from  50  per  cent  to  35  per  cent  (fig.  1).  Private 
consumption is by far too low whether we compare it to the rest of developing Asia, or to the 
industrialized countries where on average it is well above 60 per cent of total output.   11 
Fig. 1 China: internal and external imbalances 











































Gross domestic savings Current account balance (LHS)
Gross fixed capital formation Hh Consumption  
Source: author’s elaborations on CEIC data. 
 
Flow of funds data allow to isolate the contribution to China’s overall savings of the main 
economic (institutional) sectors: government, corporate and household.
14 Domestic saving S is the 
sum  of  the  savings  of  these  three  sectors  (apart  from  a  negligible  contribution  from  financial 
institutions), the overall savings to income ratio (average saving rate) can thus be expressed as: 








































s         (1) 
where Sj and Yj are gross savings and disposable income in sector j and sj and yj are average saving 
rate and the income share of the sector, while j here stands for government (g), corporate (c), or 
household (h). 
Since 2000 government and corporate savings rose sharply and now account for about 20 
and 8 percentage points (in GDP terms) up  from 10 and 3, respectively,  in the early  nineties. 
Household saving, instead,  as a share of GDP remained quite stable around 20 percent.  
Nonetheless it would be wrong to conclude that the major driving forces behind the rise of 
Chinese national savings over the past 20 years can be traced back to non-financial firms and to the 
government: instead the correct way to assess the behaviour of the agents is to look at their savings 
relative to their disposable income as clarified by the decomposition in eqn. 1. Doing so leads to a 
different conclusion. 
Over the last decade, higher fiscal revenues accrued to the Government sector, boosted by 
the  rapid  expansion  of  GDP,  by  the  increased  efficiency  in  tax  collection  (a  tax  reform  was 
approved  in  1994)  and  by  the  levies  on  land  sales  whose  value  soared.  In  the  while  public 
consumption remained quite low as a share, of GDP (fig. 2), leading to a considerable increase in 
                                                 
14 Flow of funds data are available only for the 1992-2008 period.   12 
public sector saving, which has been invested in fixed capital, both directly and indirectly (through 
capital transfer to the corporate sector).  
Fig. 2 China: Government revenues and consumption expenditure  












Source: author’s elaborations on CEIC data. 
 
Following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, saving in the corporate sector, grew globally, 
but more in Asia than in the rest of the world. China was no exception to this global trend and 




Fig. 3 Non-Financial Corporate gross saving in selected countries 
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Source: authors’ elaborations on OECD and national accounts data. 
 
                                                 
15 For the corporate sector, by definition saving coincides with disposable income, therefore we can only compare it with total GDP.  
At global level, while the rise of corporate saving was in general offset by an equal decline in household saving this was not true in 
emerging Asia and in China in particular (IMF, 2009). Also, the available micro evidence shows that China corporate sector is not 
particularly thrifty. Chinese firms (either SOE or private) do not distribute systematically less dividends than other firms in Asia, the 
common held belief that poor corporate governance in the SOEs and windfalls in resource sectors are causing high saving rates in 
China is not borne by a firm-level dataset comprising China and other Asian countries (see Bayoumi et al. , 2010). 
   13 
The high rates of corporate saving in Asia, and in China in particular, reflect tax distortions 
and poor financial development, both inducing firms to finance investments mainly through self-
retained earnings (table 3). And indeed, if one looks at Chinese data, notwithstanding the high and 
rising  level  of  savings,  the  saving-investment  balance  of  the  corporate  sector  remains  largely 









1981 28.1 12.7 3.8 55.4
1990 8.7 19.6 6.3 65.4
2000 6.4 20.3 5.1 68.2
2005 4.4 18.5 4.4 72.7
2008 5.0 14.5 2.9 78.3
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2009 and CEIC
in % of total investment
Table 3. China: Sources of Funds for Investment in Fixed Assets  
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Source: authors’ elaborations on CEIC data. 
 
We can conclude that government saving arose from insufficient spending while corporate 
sector  savings  soared  following  a  trend  common  to  other  countries  and  remaining  nonetheless 
below investment; what instead stands out as peculiar and challenging to explain (and to change) is 
the saving behaviour of Chinese households.  
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Source: author’s elaborations on CEIC data. 
 
Fig. 6 Household gross saving in selected countries 
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Source: authors’ elaborations on OECD and national accounts data. 
 
   14 
Personal saving rates in China rose steadily during the last decade (from 28 per cent to 38 
per cent of disposable  income;  fig. 5), so that, even though their disposable  income share  fell, 
personal savings remained high as a percentage of GDP, even recording a slight increase over the 
2002-2008 period (up to 23 per cent). 
These rates are high not only vis à vis other economies today (Fig. 6), but also in historical 
comparison. Other countries experienced high saving rates during phases of rapid growth. In Italy, 
for instance, private and households savings were very high during the 60’s and 70’s, but nowhere 
near the peaks reached nowadays in China (Ando et al., 1994). Also limiting the comparison to 
other Asian economies to control for a potential “cultural bias” (Zhou, 2009), Chinese households’ 
savings are exceptionally high. In Japan between the 60’s and the 70’s private savings peaked at 
almost 25 per cent of net product, those of households passed 20 per cent of disposable income 
(Hayashi, 1986).  
Furthermore, opinion polls reveal persistent concern of Chinese households for the levels of 
their savings. According to a recent Gallup survey (see Gallup, 2007) more than two-thirds of the 
people interviewed claimed that they were dissatisfied with the amount of savings they had and 
wanted more.  
The evidence presented so far shows, on the one hand, that the saving behaviors of the three 
institutional sectors are strictly related, as they are the outcome of the same development strategy, 
and, on the other hand, that Chinese households are storing an exceptionally high share of their 
disposable income and wish to continue to do so. It is therefore upon this latter fact that we would 
like to shed light with our analysis.  
 
4. A reappraisal of the life cycle explanation of Chinese households savings 
 
The  life  cycle  hypothesis  (LCH),  according  to  which  the  main  motivation  for  personal 
saving is financing consumption after retirement, is still the prominent theory or at least the starting 
point  for  most  empirical  research  on  the  topic  (see  Deaton  1992,  Deaton  &  Paxson  2000  and 
Browning & Lusardi 1996 for a review of the literature). Basing their analysis on aggregate data 
spanning from 1953 to 2000, Modigliani and Cao (2004; henceforth M&C), reached the conclusion 
that the rising amount of personal savings in China can be explained within the framework of the 
life cycle model.  
The  main  explanatory  factors  driving  up  Chinese  households  saving  from  the  very  low 
levels of the 50’s, when it trailed around 5 per cent of disposable income, to the heights of late 90’s,   15 
when it reached 30 per cent, have been the rapid growth of the economy and the dramatic changes 
in the demographic structure, induced by the one-child policy.
16 M&C measure these determinants 
by a long-term average of real per capita disposable income growth and by the ratio of employees to 
minors, the latter being defined as people below 14 years of age.
17 
The first factor can be rationalized within the life cycle framework by the fact that, in a fast 
growth environment, young generations in their saving phase are much richer than older generations 
in their dissaving phase pushing up overall personal savings and saving rates.
18 
The one-child policy affected the saving behaviour of Chinese households in two ways: 
reducing  consumption  needs  (and  so  the  income  share  of  consumption,  C/Y)  for  families  with 
children and removing what was in the Chinese tradition a substitute for savings for retirement. In 
China, as well as in many other Asian countries, children have the obligation to take care of the 
elderly,  not  only  by  social  norms  but  also  by  law.  In  rural  areas,  where  no  other  forms  of 
government support were in place until very recently, elderly traditionally relied on their children. 
The rapid urbanization of younger generations and the evolution of social norms have progressively 
weakened this extended-family arrangement (OECD 2010).  
The core equation in M&C paper is: 
 
( ) ( ) t t t t t t p a g y a M E a g a a sr D + - D + + + = 4 3 2 1 0         (1) 
 
where (sr) is the saving rate, (g) is disposable income long term growth, E/M the ratio of employees 
to minors,  g y - D  is annual deviation from long term growth and  p D  is CPI inflation. Their main 
results are reported in Table 4: long term income growth and the E/M ratio are strongly significant 
and positively affect households’ savings in all subperiods originally considered.  
                                                 
16 In the last thirty years China experienced a dramatic demographic change: in 1978 the share of young population (aged 0-14) in 
total population was 65 per cent, by 2008 such a share was below 30 per cent.  
17 In their paper Modigliani and Cao consider different alternatives for the long-term growth, here we chose a fourteen years average 
growth rate from 1966 onwards, approximating it with the longest possible average for the period 1957-1965. This choice allows us 
to reproduce almost exactly the regression results reported in table 3 of the M&C paper. The variable they select to take into account 
the changes in the population structure is a proxy of the young dependency ratio, given by the number of employees divided by the 
number of persons below 14 years of age.    
18 Several theories consider the role of income growth. At aggregate level the relationship between saving rates and income growth is 
positive; in standard growth models the direction of causation goes from saving rates to growth rates. The evidence, however, 
suggests that the causation could also run in the other direction, with the saving rate responding to income growth, both at aggregate 
and microeconomic level (Carroll et al., 2000). The LCH reconciles the evidence with the theory arguing that in fast growing 
economies, like China, young generations in their saving phase being much richer than older generations in their dissaving phase 
push progressively up the average saving rate of the economy. Additional refinements to the theory include the habit formation 
hypothesis (HFH) according to which individuals care about both the level and the rate of growth of consumption, smoothing the 
two. As a consequence, following a positive (negative) income shock consumption adjusts slowly and the saving-to-income ratio 
increases (decreases).   16 
 
Table 4: Modigliani and Cao regressions  
on the original (1953-2000) period 





E/M                  
( a2 )
Deviation from 
long term income 
growth ( a3 )
inflation       
( a4 )
R^2 = 0.98 0.1 2.07 0.1 0.1 0.26
tvalue -11 8.85 9.04 2.08 3.78
R^2 = 0.92 -0.13 1.52 0.14 0.14 0.74
tvalue -3.23 3.5 3.04 1.95 1.79
R^2 = 0.96 -0.1 2.52 0.09 0.13 0.18
tvalue -6.22 8.8 7.9 2.23 2.81




Source: Modigliani and Cao 2004 
 
Since then, the personal saving rate rose even higher, reaching 40 per cent of disposable 
income in 2008. Extending the sample to cover these most recent figures and taking into account 
the data revisions intervened in the meantime
19 does not seem to change the good fit of M&C 
regressors, at least visually (see fig 7). 
 
Fig. 7: Chinese households saving rate & disposable income; overall dependency ratio 
China: households savings and long term income growth






















Saving rate (left scale) Per capita income long term growth  
China: households savings and young dependency ratio






















Saving rate (left scale) Employees/minors (persons below 14 years of age)  
Source: Modigliani and Cao 2004, CBS and authors computations 
 
 
Estimation of the same relation postulated by M&C, extending the sample to cover the years 
2001-08  confirms  their  results  for  long  term  growth  (g),  that  is  always  highly  significant  and 




                                                 
19 See appendix for details.   17 
 
 
Table 5: Modigliani and Cao regressions 
on the “extended” (1953-2008) period 





E/M                  
(a2 )
Deviation from 
long term income 
growth ( a3 )
inflation       
(a4 )
R^2 = 0.98 -0.09 2.49 0.08 0.05 0.12
DW = 0.74 -11.98 9.46 8.94 0.78 2.05
R^2 = 0.92 -0.14 1.49 0.15 0.14 0.18
DW = 0.93 -2.75 2.57 2.53 1.85 1.75
R^2 = 0.96 -0.07 2.75 0.07 0 0.05
DW = 0.76 -4.67 6.5 6.37 0.02 0.72
III. 1978-2008
I. 1953-2008 (all years)
II. 1953-1985
 
    Source: Modigliani and Cao 2004, CBS and authors computations 
 
On the other hand, the extended and revised sample weakens the relation between saving 
rate and deviations from long-run income ( t t g y - D ) and also the link with inflation ( t p D ) appears 
flimsy, being significant only in the regression over the entire sample.
20 
However, the specification suffers from a number of econometric problems as can be easily 
spotted noting that DW statistics lay all around 1, signaling positive autocorrelation in the residuals. 
Introducing in (1) the lagged dependent variable among the regressors solves the problem
21, but on 
the most recent sample the dependency ratio is barely significant, long-term growth has a somewhat 
reduced effect, while deviations from long-term growth have a much stronger (positive) effect on 
the saving rate (see eq. 2). 
 
( ) ( )
2008 1978 :    , 51 . 2    , 99 . 0
02 . 0 22 . 0 02 . 0 21 . 1 66 . 0 03 . 0
2
) 47 . 0 ( ) 24 . 4 ( ) 94 . 1 ( ) 99 . 3 ( 1 ) 82 . 7 ( ) 52 . 2 (
- = =
D + - D + + + + - = - -
sample DW R
p g y M E g sr sr t t t t t t t
      (2) 
 
Taken together this evidence seems to weaken the case put forward by Modigliani and Cao. 
But this  is  not the  main  objection  that  can  be  moved  to the  life  cycle  explanation  of  Chinese 
households savings. There are other, deeper reasons to doubt that the life cycle framework really 
captures the whole story of rising personal savings in China. Studies based on province-level and 
                                                 
20 The main factor behind the change in the results is therefore given by the new data rather than by the revision, as can be seen bty 
comparing the equations for the period 1953-1985, affected only by the latter and almost identical in terms of the significance of the 
regressors. 
21 Godfrey’s test for serial correlation up to the fourth order shows no evidence of autocorrelation in the residuals of the estimated 
equation (Chi-Square(4) p-value = 0.2014).   18 
household-level  data (see Horioka and  Wan 2007, Chamon and Prasad 2010)  have  shown that 
demographic changes and long-run growth are far from being the one and only cause of rising 
saving  in  China.  Inertia  and  current  income  growth  play  a  major  role  in  these  data,  while 
demographic variables are rarely relevant. The age-profile of urban households saving rate became 
U-shaped starting in the mid-90’s, and the saving rate itself peaks in old age. Clearly it is hard to 
reconcile these facts with life-cycle hypothesis. 
While  the  determinants  singled  out  by  M&C  can  partly  explain  the  surge  of  Chinese 
personal savings from the very low levels preceding the economic reforms to the heights of the 
nineties, they fall short of fully accounting for the persistent growth of the saving rate since then 
and for differences that emerge across provinces as well as between rural and urban households. 
M&C evidence rests on China being treated as an homogeneous reality but this is far from being 
true, one explanation will most likely not “fit the whole China”. The development strategy followed 
since 1978 by Chinese authorities, based on the gradual opening to “free market” in designated 
areas  of  the  country  (special  economic  zones),  characterized  by  big  urban  agglomerates  and 
proximity to major ports, led to a fast but unevenly distributed growth of income, both among 
provinces and between rural and urban population. Today there still exist large gaps in development 
levels among Eastern, Central and Western provinces (see Table B2 in the Appendix B). It is not 
possible to tell a coherent story about Chinese savings by looking only at country-wide statistics. 
For this reason, we believe that an analysis based on more disaggregated data is crucial to uncover 
more recent saving dynamics. 
 
5. One size does not fit all China: the provincial-level analysis 
5.1 Household savings and disparities across China 
In the last twenty years household savings in China increased faster than disposable income 
in both urban and rural areas. According to NSBC’s household survey data (which underestimate 
the flow of funds figures presented before, see Appendix A), from 1991 to 2010 in urban areas 
household savings grew by 13 per cent per annum in real terms, compared to an average growth of 
disposable income of 10 per cent, pushing the saving to income ratio up from 15.3 to 29.5 per cent; 
in rural areas savings and disposable income grew respectively by 8.5 and 6.4 per cent and the 
saving rate climbed to 26 per cent, from 14.8 per cent (Table 6).
22  
                                                 
22 According to flow of funds data the household savings reached 38 per cent of disposable income in 2007. The discrepancies 
between flow of funds and survey data are well known and highlighted often in the literature as puzzling. An inspection of the data 
reveals that survey data are more volatile and tend to underestimate both income and savings, the underestimation of the latter is 
more pronounced. All in all, however, the dynamics of the saving rate results quite comparable (see Appendix A).   19 
These  numbers  are  quite  impressive,  not  least  because  per  capita  annual  income  is  on 
average  still  very  low,  around  4,800  US$  in  urban  areas,  and  just  1,500  US$  in  rural  ones 
(expressed in 2010 purchasing power parities). 
The fast growth of income has been accompanied by large migrations from rural to urban 
areas. Since the beginning of the 90’s the share of urban population has almost doubled, reaching 50 
per cent of the total in 2010 (Table 6).  
 


















1990 26.4 2.2 15.3 14.8 15.0
1995 29.0 2.7 17.4 16.9 17.2
2000 36.2 2.8 20.4 25.9 22.5
2005 43.0 3.2 24.3 21.5 23.5
2010 49.7 3.2 29.5 26.0 28.7  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years, and authors’ elaborations. 
 
 
The rapid urbanization has been coupled with rising income disparities: in 2010 per capita 
disposable income in urban areas was 3.2 times higher than in rural areas; the income share of urban 
households now is more than 3/4 of total household income and is likely to increase further as the 
urbanization process continues.
23  
Although aggregate saving rates rose in both urban and rural areas, they followed different 
paths over time and across provinces. In urban areas the increase was steady and quite even across 
provinces; in rural areas, instead, it was more volatile.  
Taking averages for the years 2001-2008, urban household saving rates range from 16.6 per 
cent in Chongqing to 30.1 in Jiangsu, while those for rural households go from 7.9 in Shaanxi to 
48.8 per cent in Tianjin (see Appendix B, Table B2). 
A quick look at the map also reveals that households residing in the richest provinces along 
the coast tend to save more out of disposable income, while those residing in the poorest provinces 
located in central China in general can afford to save less, particularly in rural Shaanxi, Hunan, 
Yunnan and Guizhou (fig. 9).   
                                                 
23 A more thorough comparison of urban and rural households is given in tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix.    20 
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Household saving rate in rural areas (2001-2008 average)
 
Source: CEIC and authors’ calculations. 
 
During  the  last  decade  urban  household  saving  rates  rose  sharply,  while  those  of  rural 
household fluctuated around their 2000 level. In the past rural saving rates were generally higher 
than urban ones in most provinces, but from 2000 onwards they have fallen below them in several 
provinces. These trends reflect, among other things, the urbanization of youngest workers, which, 
despite the limitations imposed by the household registration system, went on steadily in the last 
few years, increasing the stock of unofficial migrants (Chan, 2008).
24  
According  to  OECD  (2010),  in  2005  the  unofficial  migrant  population  in  urban  China 
amounted to 126 millions of individuals (so called non-hukou migration), of which 74 millions 
coming from rural areas. Our estimates confirm, as expected, that the richest provinces receive the 
largest net migration inflows; for instance, in Shanghai and Guandong about 30 per cent of the 
population consists of non-hokou migrants; in Beijing such a share reaches 50 per cent. Since access 
to health care, education, social security services, as well as to better jobs is based on residency, 
non-hokou migrants find themselves in very poor living conditions. 
A growing body of literature attributes the increase of household saving rate in urban areas 
to precautionary motives and liquidity constraints (Horioka and Wan, 2007; Chamon and Prasad, 
2010; Jin et al. 2009; Wei and Zhang, 2009). While in M&C regressions these elements were not 
included, we deem very important to consider them in the analysis.  
                                                 
24 Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there are no data that allow to estimate internal migration flows from rural to urban areas by age. 
Nevertheless, it is plausible that such flows consist primarily of young working-age individuals. Assuming that those workers were 
formerly employed in rural areas, when they move to urban areas the working-age population reduces in rural areas and so does the 
average saving rate there, while in urban areas, where such a population increases, the average saving rate tends to increase.        21 
Various factors might have contributed to induce higher savings for precautionary motives. 
In the last fifteen years the urban pension system underwent major changes. The downsizing of the 
public sector and the restructuring process of the SOEs has led to a significant drop in the number 
of their employees and to a gradual dismantling of benefits for those still working there.
25 
Since the introduction of the reforms in 1978, aimed at transforming China into a market 
economy, traditional safety nets have progressively eroded in both rural and urban areas, increasing 
the need for individuals to save in order to self-insure against adverse shocks. Along with increasing 
urbanization, in the last fifteen years the urban pension system, previously based on state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), where the majority of urban workers were employed, underwent major changes. 
The  downsizing  of  the  public  sector  and  the  restructuring  process  of  the  SOEs  has  led  to  a 
significant drop in the number of their employees and to a gradual dismantling of benefits for those 
still working there. At the same time the burden of social spending shifted from enterprises to local 
governments. 
While almost all workers employed in SOEs are covered under the new pension system, the 
participation  is  much  lower  for  those  employed  in  private  enterprises  and  almost  nil  for  self-
employed and workers without labor contracts.
26 These last two categories, which account for about 
60 per cent of total employment in urban areas, and are largely composed by immigrants, need to 
save in order to self-insure for old-age and to send money to relatives in the countryside. One 
important reason why workers may choose not to participate to the pension system is because it is 
fragmented  in  thousands  of  diverse  municipal  sub-systems.  As  municipalities  have  different 
dependency ratios, contribution rates vary among them while benefits are still hardly portable from 
one municipality to the other. For the mobile, non-hukou migrants the lack of portability is a strong 
limitation spurring them to keep savings high in order to self-insure. 
Health  care  expenditures  are  another  important  source  of  uncertainty.  Like  the  pension 
system, the health care system is managed locally: medical insurance is based on local schemes and 
insured patients can access health care only in the area of residency. As a consequence, non-hukou 
migrants have no coverage in the city where they live. Medical care outlays have grown fast in 
recent years, affecting uninsured as well as insured people, as matter of fact, the latter still have to 
pay 45 per cent of their own medical expenses (OECD, 2010).  
                                                 
25 SOEs are mainly located in urban areas. In 1978, out of 95 millions of urban workers 75 were employed in SOEs, enjoying 
generous benefits, for pensions, health insurance, schooling and housing. In 2008 65 millions of urban workers, out of 302, were 
employed in SOEs, with considerably lower benefits. The new pension system has set the replacement rate at 58.5 per cent of 
average earnings on retirement, down from 80 per cent in the pre-reform period. Such a replacement rate, however, will be hardly 
reached, as the interest rate used to revalue part of the contributions is considerably lower than the rate of growth of average wages. 
In 2005 the ratio of the average pension to the average wage was 49 per cent (it was 77 per cent in 1990) and it is projected to decline 
further, provoking a considerable cut in the pension wealth for the youngest cohort in the labor force (OECD 2010). 
   22 
It is difficult to quantify how much of the household saving is due to precautionary motives. 
Jin et al. (2009) estimate the impact of the mid-1990 pension reform on urban savings and found 
that it increased the saving rate by 6 percentage points for young urban cohorts and by 3 percentage 
points for the cohort aged 50-59. Barnett and Brooks (2010) assess the impact of public health care 
spending  on  household’s  savings  and  found  that  in  urban  areas  for  each  Yuan  increase  in 
government health spending savings decrease by 2 Yuan. Baldacci et al. (2010) using a panel of 24 
OECD  countries,  calculate  that  in  China  an  increase  of  1  percentage  point  of  GDP  in  social 
spending would reduce savings by 0.6-1 points of GDP. The effect of heath spending could be 
much higher, around 2 percentage points of GDP, while a 1 percent increase in education spending 
could reduce saving by 1.3 percentage points of GDP. 
Along with the precautionary  motive also  liquidity constraints  might play  a role  in this 
saving  puzzle.  Chinese  households  are  financially  constrained  mainly  because  of  a  lack  of 
collaterals. Even though in recent years housing and consumer credit expanded rapidly, the high 
level of down payments (relative to income) required to purchase a house or to buy expensive 
durable goods force households to save (Zhang and Wan, 2004).    
5.2 Econometric analysis of households savings with provincial-level data 
To  assess  the  significance  of  the  main  determinants  of  the  household  saving  behavior 
singled out in previous sections we exploit the variation across provinces as well as among rural and 
urban realities. To this purpose we construct a panel collecting data on 29 Chinese provinces over 
the period 1995-2009, using household surveys.
27 We run separate regressions for urban and rural 
households while also splitting the sample in two subgroups, distinguishing Eastern and Central 
from Western provinces. There are good reasons to consider the Western provinces separately, over 
and  above  their  lower  development  level.  In  Western  provinces  government  transfers  for 
redistributive purposes are higher, furthermore, as Western China is largely populated by ethnic 
minorities (Western China accounts for 75 per cent of the country's ethnic minority population) the 
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where h denotes the type of household (h = urban, rural); i the region and t the year. The dependent 
variable is the household saving rate (SR). X is a vector of explanatory variables which includes 
those  used  by  M&C  and  some  additional  ones  aimed  at  measuring  precautionary  motives  and 
                                                 
27 Survey data by province are collected annually by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. A description of the survey can be 
found on the NBSC website:  http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2009/indexeh.htm. China has 31 provinces, we excluded Tibet and 
Chongqing because data were missing for several years.   23 
liquidity constraints. To capture precautionary motives, in urban regressions we include the share of 
urban  employment  in  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEempsh).  We  postulate  that  precautionary 
motives should play a lesser role for workers in the SOEs as they enjoy more stable jobs, higher 
retirement benefits and better health care. In rural regressions we include the urban to rural income 
ratio  in the province (URRURincratio). This ratio, is  introduced as a proxy  for data on  family 
transfers (remittances) from rural migrants. The idea is that higher disparities between urban and 
rural  areas  within  a  province  stimulate  migration  and  increase  the  scope  for  remittances  from 
migrant workers toward their rural relatives, lowering the need to save for rural households.
28  
We  also  re-introduce  the  reciprocal  of  current  real  disposable  income  to  account  for 
“Keynesian” motives for savings. This variable was considered by M&C but dismissed as it turned 
out not significant. 
Tables 7a and 7b show that the determinants of the saving rate are indeed quite different for 
urban and rural households as well as for Central-Eastern and Western provinces. Focusing on the 
first group of provinces results show that for urban households, over the sample period considered 
here, long-run growth is not significant. Instead annual deviations from it and the (reciprocal of) 
current real disposable income have a negative impact on the saving rate, possibly indicating that 
there are credit constraints limiting consumption smoothing over time. The employment to minors 
ratio has a positive and slightly significant impact on saving rates as one would anticipate from 
LCH. But when the employment share in SOEs is introduced, this ratio loses explanatory power, 
confirming  Horioka  and  Wan  (2007)  and  Chamon  and  Prasad  (2010)  findings.  The  coefficient 
associated with the employment share in the SOEs is negative and highly significant. A possible 
interpretation is that more children as well as higher employment in SOEs reduce the need to save 
for old age.
29  
For urban households living in the Western provinces (columns 5 and 6 of table 7a) only 
current  disposable  income  turns  out  significant,  indicating  that  the  traditional  Keynesian 
explanation is sufficient.  
                                                 
28 Di Stefano (2010) using data from the 2002 Chinese Income Project survey shows that rural migrants (whose median age is 26) 
have a saving rate slightly above urban average and send about one third of the savings to their relatives. 
29 The young dependency ratio variable is particularly important for its trend component. In the sample period such a component is 
common to young dependency ratio and the SOEs’ employment share, as they both decreased sharply. On the other hand the cross 
sectional dimension of the latter has a much greater explanatory power for provincial saving rates, hence when both are considered in 
the same regression only the SOE variable remain significant.   24 
Table 7a – Household saving in urban China: M&C regressions on a panel of 29 provinces, 1995-2009 
– dependent variable: saving rate – FE estimation 
 
Explanatory variables
Long term income growth -0.11 -0.11 -0.27 -0.21 0.45 0.39
Deviation from long term income growth -0.26** -0.32*** -0.30** -0.37*** -0.13 -0.19
E/M (reciprocal of young dependency ratio) 0.007* 0.002 -0.008** -0.007 -0.002 -0.02
Reciprocal of current real disp. income -6.23*** -6.04*** -6.47*** -6.35*** -7.09** -6.72**
Inflation 0.08** 0.08** 0.09* 0.09* -0.05 -0.05
SOEempsh -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.03
No. Obs 406 406 266 266 140 140
R^2 0.65 0.67 0.73 0.75 0.54 0.55
Urban total Urban East and Central Urban West
 
Note:  Regional  dummies  included  in  all  regressions;  standard  errors  are  robust  to  heteroskedasticity  and  serial 
correlation; *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. All the variables are at provincial-level. For each geographic group we run 
two regressions: the first replicate exactly M&C’s regressions on provincial-level data, the second includes the variable 
SOEempsh, not considered by M&C. 
 
In rural regressions (table 7b), long-run growth is barely significant in Eastern and Central 
provinces and deviations from long-run growth and young dependency ratio do not matter. Higher 
urban/rural  inequality  reduces  the  saving  rate,  as  we  anticipated.  Current  income  is  slightly 
significant  only  in  Western  provinces.  The  inflation  rate  is  negative  and  significant  in  all 
regressions, indicating that, in rural areas, households anticipate consumption when inflation rises. 
 
Table 7b – Household saving in rural China: M&C regressions on a panel of 29 provinces, 
1995-2009 – dependent variable: saving rate – FE estimation 
 
Explanatory variables
Long term income growth -1.11* -1.11* -0.45 -0.56 -2.22 -2.01*
Deviation from long term income growth -0.09 -0.17 0.18 0.19 0.05 0.21
E/M (reciprocal of young dependency ratio) -0.006 0.002 -0.008 -0.002 -0.002 0.018
Reciprocal of current real disp. income -0.51 -1.07* -0.56 -1.07 -0.75 -0.97
Inflation -0.61*** -0.54*** -0.65*** -0.59*** -0.52** -0.46**
URRURincratio -0.05*** -0.04** -0.06**
No. Obs 406 406 266 266 140 140
R^2 0.34 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.41 0.42
Rural total Rural East and Central Rural West
 
Note:  Regional  dummies  included  in  all  regressions;  standard  errors  are  robust  to  heteroskedasticity  and  serial 
correlation; *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. All variables are at provincial-level. For each geographic group we run 
two regressions: the first replicate exactly M&C’s regressions on provincial-level data, the second includes the variable 
URRURincratio, not considered by M&C. 
 
As a robustness check we estimated our models using a dynamic panel GMM framework, 
thus allowing for potential endogeneity problems as well as persistence in savings. Since the GMM 
estimation requires a large number of instruments while the observations are limited, we only run 
the two separate regressions for urban and rural households without distinguishing among poor and 
rich provinces.   25 
The results in table 8 show that, even controlling for persistence, the evidence derived from 
the  fixed-effects  regressions  is  generally  confirmed.  The  coefficient  on  the  lagged  dependent 
variable for both types of households lies between 0.45 and 0.5, indicating a moderate level of 
persistence, in line with findings in Horioka and Wan (2007). 
For urban households, the deviation from long-term growth and the reciprocal of current real 
income continue to have a significant negative impact on the saving rate, suggesting that credit 
constraints might be playing a role. The share of employment in SOEs exerts a negative effect, 
backing up the precautionary motive hypothesis.  
For rural households, GMM estimation confirms the negative effect of long-run growth, the 
reciprocal of current income, inflation and urban/rural inequality. The GMM model fits the data 
very well and represents a great improvement compared to fixed-effect regressions (see Appendix 
B, fig. B1 to B3).  
 
Table 8 – Household saving in urban and rural China: M&C regressions on a panel of 29 provinces, 
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In table 9 we report the  long-run  impact on personal  savings of one standard deviation 
increase in the value of our regressors.
30 The effects of these variations are not only statistically but 
also economically significant. A 1.7 percentage points increase in long-term growth reduces the 
                                                 
30 With the sole exception of the real disposable income, for which we consider a 10 per cent increase evaluated at the sample mean, 
since it enters in a non-linear way in the regressions. For summary statistics concerning the regressors see table A3 in the Appendix.   26 
saving rate in rural areas by 1.5 percentage points; a 2.5 percentage points positive deviation of 
current growth from its long-term trend decreases urban savings by 0.7 percentage points. Wage 
inequality between urban and rural households has a strong impact on rural savings, a one standard 
deviation increase in the wage ratio reduces saving by 3.6 percentage points. For urban families, an 
important  factor  is  given  by  the  share  of  employees  enjoying  the  greater  protection  of  SOE 
contracts: a one standard deviation increase in this share reduces savings by 0.7 percentage points. 
 
Table 9. Estimated effects on household saving rates  (according to GMM results)  
 
Explanatory variable  increase 
one s.d.; unless 
otherwise indicated Urban Rural
Long term income growth 1.7 (pp) 0 -1.5
Deviation from long term income growth 2.4 (pp) -0.7 0
E/M (reciprocal of young dependency ratio) 1.5 0 -1.9
Real disposable income (1) 10.0 (%) 0.5 0.5
Inflation 6.9 (pp) 0 -3.6
SOEempsh (2) 8.3 (pp) -0.7 0




Notes: pp indicates percentage points. (1) Evaluated at the sample mean; we consider an increase of real annual disposable income of 788 Yuan for 
urban households and 290 Yuan for rural households. (2) Standard deviation is computed on cross-province time averages (see table A3). (3) Standard 
deviation is computed on cross-time provincial averages (see table A3).  
 
We might conclude that policies that permanently increase long-run income growth in the 
countryside  and  improve  welfare  provision  in  regular  labour  contracts  in  urban  areas  are  most 
effective in reducing household savings. Provincial level estimates do not support traditional life 
cycle/permanent income hypotheses as claimed also in Chamon and Prasad (2010) and Horioka and 
Wan (2007). Households saving rates show a moderate level of inertia; long-run income growth and 
demographic  factors  do  not  help  to  explain  savings  in  urban  areas.  On  the  contrary,  credit 
constraints and precautionary motives seem more powerful explanations.  
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
Our main points are the following: (1) aggregate time series evidence does not fully support 
the LCH as an explanation of rising personal savings in China, once we take into account data for 
the last decade and contrary to results in Modigliani and Cao (2004); (2) most recent data show 
clearly that urban and rural households behaved differently with the first being responsible for most 
of the recent rise in savings rate; (3) neither demographic factors, nor rapid growth seem able to   27 
explain this fact; (4) hence the “one size fits all” assumption implicit in the aggregate analysis is put 
into question; (5) using provincial level data, exploiting the variation across provinces as well as 
among rural and urban realities we conclude that precautionary motives and liquidity constraints 
appear to be the likely causes of the recent increase in household savings in urban China. 
Results  drawn  form  aggregate  data  might  hide  very  different  responses,  to  the  same 
variables, at a disaggregated level. This has important implications from a policy perspective. The 
lack of adequate social safety nets and the uncertainties induced by recent reforms are boosting self-
insurance needs especially for pension and health care purposes. Precautionary motives can explain 
the high saving rate of elders, for which health care expenditures are of a growing relevance, as well 
as  the  foregone  consumption  of  young  households  that  save  for  their  children  education  (see 
Brugiavini et al., 2010 and Chamon and Prasad, 2010). These needs are not temporary in nature. 
Addressing them requires government intervention primarily aimed at improving and harmonizing 
welfare provisions across municipalities and provinces, facilitating the portability of benefits and 
granting the access to public services for rural immigrants.  
Table 10 shows that the government has indeed plenty of room to act quickly in increasing 
(and reallocating) spending for education, social security and health care. Total public expenditure 
in  these  areas  is  very  low  in  terms  of  GDP  and  as  a  share  of  total  government  outlays.
31  As 
urbanization will continue to increase, central government intervention should not only reduce labor 
market  segmentations,  but  also  at  enforce  formal  labor  contracts  which  would  raise  migrant 
workers’ wages while requiring employers to contribute to social insurance funds.
32 A side effect of 
the advancement of urban workers economic situation, as shown by our results, is to reduce the 
propensity to save in the countryside through remittances.  
 
                                                 
31 Even compared with South Korea, which has the lowest public social expenditure as percentage of GDP within the OECD 
countries and a demographic structure similar to China, the Chinese government spends about fifty percent less as a share of GDP 
overall in social and education programs. 
32 These policies should be implemented at central level, since local governments might have incentives to not enforce labor market 
regulations in order to attract businesses (see Park et al., 2010).   28 






 2007 70.8 14.3 10.9 4.0
 2008 70.3 14.4 10.9 4.4
 2009 71.1 13.7 10.0 5.2
 2007 13.3 2.7 2.0 0.7
 2008 14.0 2.9 2.2 0.9
 2009 15.9 3.1 2.2 1.2
Memorandum: 2006 2007 2008 2009
Government 
Balance as % of 
GDP -1.0 0.2 -0.8 -2.8
% of GDP
% of total government expenditures
 
Source: authors’ elaborations on CEIC data. 
 
Personal savings are also kept high by the obstacles that the financial underdevelopment 
poses to consumption smoothing. In the medium-run government intervention should reduce the 
shortage  of  financial  instrument  to  facilitate  households’  access  to  credit  and  financial  assets 
diversification.
33  
                                                 
33 An important area of intervention, not analyzed in this paper, is land property rights. A better definition of these rights, particularly 
in rural areas, would provide a much needed collateral for households (see Marconi and Santoro, 2006).   29 
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Appendix A: Data 
 
 
A1. Data Sources 
“Modigliani and Cao” regressions over the sample period 1953-2000, reported in Table 4, are 
conducted using original data from Modigliani and Cao (2004; Table 1, p. 147).  
“Modigliani and Cao” regressions on the “extended” period (1953-2008), reported in Table 5, are 
run on an updated version of the original dataset. We updated the variables as follows: 
 
Table A1 “Modigliani and Cao” extended dataset 
Variable  Method  Source 




data from Modigliani and Cao  
1992-2008  
data from National Accounts - Flow-of-Funds 
statistics.  
Modigliani and Cao (2004; Table 1 p. 
147)  
National Bureau of Statistics China. 
Household Saving (nominal) 
 
1952-1991  
data from Modigliani and Cao  
1992-2008  
data from National Accounts - Flow-of-Funds 
statistics. 
Modigliani and Cao (2004; Table 1 p. 
147)  
National Bureau of Statistics China. 




Household Consumption + Household Saving  Modigliani and Cao (2004; Table 1 p. 
147)  
National Bureau of Statistics China. 
Household Saving Ratio 
 
Household Saving/Household Income  Modigliani and Cao (2004; Table 1 p. 
147)  




data from Modigliani and Cao 
2001-2008  
Consumer Price Index, previous year=100  
Modigliani and Cao (2004; Table 1 p. 
147)  
National Bureau of Statistics China. 
Population  1952-2008 Total population by census  National Bureau of Statistics China. 
E/M  1952-1988  
data from Modigliani and Cao 
1988-2008  
Total Employment/Population aged 0-14 
Modigliani and Cao (2004; Table 1 p. 
147)  
Ministry  of  Human  Resources  and 
Social Security 
National Bureau of Statistics 
 
                                                 
34 Real figures for household income are obtained deflating nominal figures by the consumer price index.   33 
Regressions reported in tables 7a and 7b are based on household survey data by province. Household 
survey data at provincial level are collected annually by the National Bureau of Statistics and are 
available for urban and rural households. Disposable income and consumption expenditures are 
available  only  in  nominal  per-capita  terms.  A  fully  balanced  set  of  data  for  rural  and  urban 
households spans from the period 1995-2008. Data sources and methodologies are described in 
table A2.  
 
Table A2 Provincial-data dataset  
Variable  Period/Method/Availability  Source 




For  urban  household  data  refers  to  disposable 
income; for rural households it refers to net income 
 
 
Household survey - National Bureau of 
Statistics China. 
Consumption 
Expenditure  per 
Capita (nominal) 
1995-2008  
Available for urban and rural households 
 
Household survey - National Bureau of 
Statistics China. 




Urban  Household:  (disposable  income  per  capita-
consumption  expenditure  per  capita)/disposable 
income per capita 
Rural  Household:  (net  income  per  capita-













National Bureau of Statistics China. 
Population  1995-2008  
population by census available at provincial level 
 
National Bureau of Statistics China. 
Young  dependency 
ratio 
1995-2008  
population aged 0-14 in the province/ population 
aged 15-64 in the province 
 
 
Population survey (Registered 
population) National Bureau of 
Statistics China. 
Employment in SOE  1995-2008  
Available at provincial level 
China Statistical Yearbook- National 
Bureau of Statistics China; Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security. 
Employment  1995-2008 
Urban employment; Total employment  





                                                 
35 Real figures for household income are obtained deflating nominal figures by the consumer price index.   34 
A2. Discrepancies between flow-of-funds-based and household survey-based measures of 
saving in China. 
 
It  is  well  known  that  national  level  statistics  are  seldom  completely  coherent  with 
aggregations derived from survey and we do not expect this to be contradicted by data on China. 
Data  may  not  only  be  affected  by  measurement  errors  but  also  they  often  refers  to  different 
concepts. Differences in the definition of consumption, population of reference and income sources 
prevent a direct comparison between aggregate measures of saving rates and measures derived from 
micro sources. However  it  is  important to establish to what extent the  main trends showed by 
national level data are borne also by the evidence derived aggregating micro data. A comparison 
between household saving rates derived from flow-of-funds statistics and those derived from urban 
and rural household surveys highlights wide differences in time profiles over the period 1992-2008.  
 
Fig. A1 China: households saving rate ( per cent) 













1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
Survey Flow of funds
Source: CEIC and author's calculations
 
Major differences emerges from 1995 to 2000, when the flow of funds saving rate is more or 
less stable while household survey’s one is trending upward steeply, on the contrary from 2000 
onwards the flow of funds saving rate start to increase at a much faster pace compared to that 
derived from the household survey. As for the levels, wide gaps emerge with the flow of funds 
saving rate lying always above that of survey (about 12 points of disposable income in 2008, fig. 
A1). Further insight can be gained by looking separately at the two determinants of the saving rate: 
income and saving per capita. As can be seen (fig. A2) in both cases survey data give a lower 
estimate in terms of levels and the gap between the series, almost constant considering disposable 
income, is widening in the case of savings, likely reflecting different definition of consumption in 
the two accounting systems. In particular, household saving derived  from survey data does not 
include  household  investment  (Kraay,  2000).  In  addition,  underestimation  might  due  to  low 
coverage or underreporting of high income households.      
Despite these large differences, however, we maintain that the main trend we are interested in, 
i.e. the sharp rise in savings, are not affected by the choice of data. We can therefore be confident 
that the internal coherence of data allow us to carry a meaningful analysis on provincial-level data 
with a bearing also in explaining aggregate behavior.   
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Fig. A2 China households disposable income and savings 
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Year
Survey Flow of funds
Source: CEIC and authors' calculations.
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Year
Survey Flow of funds
Source: CEIC and authors' calculations
Households saving (Billions of RMB)
 
 
A3. Summary statistics. 
 
Table A3 summary statistics of main variables 
Variable mean max min sd
UH saving rate 22.4 36 12.9 4.91
RH saving rate 23.3 51.6 -6.4 10.27
Long term income growth 10.85 15.56 7.06 1.72
Deviation from long term income growth 0.61 11.09 -10.07 2.45
E/M (reciprocal of young dependency ratio) 3.66 10.37 1.9 1.46
UH real disposable income 7875 25234 3144 3815
RH real disp. income 2903 10922 946 1617
Inflation 4.43 26.9 -3.24 6.9
SOEempsh* 47.9 60.9 28.2 8.29
URRURincratio** 2.85 3.1 2.43 0.25  
 
* Computed on cross-province time averages. ** Computed on cross-time provincial averages.  36 
Table A4 Basic Conditions of Urban Households 
Item 1990 1995 2000 2008 2009
     Average Household Size                                 (person) 3.50 3.23 3.13 2.91 2.89
     Average Number of Employed Persons Per 1.98 1.87 1.68 1.48 1.49
       Household                                                    (person)                    
     Proportion of Employment per Household            (%) 56.57 57.89 53.67 50.86 51.56
     Number of Dependents per Employee                    
       (including the employee himself or herself) (person) 1.77 1.73 1.86 1.97 1.94
  Per Capita Annual Income                                 (yuan) 1516.21 4279.02 6295.91 17067.78 18858.09
      Income from Wages and Salaries 1149.70 3390.21 4480.50 11298.96 12382.11
      Net Business Income 22.50 72.62 246.24 1453.57 1528.68
      Income from Properties 15.60 90.43 128.38 387.02 431.84
      Income from Transfer 328.41 725.76 1440.78 3928.23 4515.45
      Disposable Income 1510.16 4282.95 6279.98 15780.76 17174.65
  Per Capita Annual Consumption Expenditure (yuan) 1278.89 3537.57 4998.00 11242.85 12264.55
Saving deposits per capita (% disposable income) 61.1 155.7 180.5 183.7 n.a.
Saving rate (% disposable income) 15.3 17.4 20.4 28.8 28.6
  Composition of Per Capita Annual Consumption
     Expenditure                                                        (%)
      Food 54.3 50.1 39.4 37.9 36.5
      Clothing 13.4 13.5 10.0 10.4 10.5
      Residence 7.0 8.0 11.3 10.2 10.0
      Household Facilities, Articles and Services 10.1 7.4 7.5 6.2 6.4
      Health Care and Medical Services 2.0 3.1 6.4 7.0 7.0
      Transport and Communication 1.2 5.2 8.5 12.6 13.7
      Education, Cultural and Recreation Services 11.1 9.4 13.4 12.1 12.0
      Miscellaneous Goods and Services 0.9 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.9
  
 
Table A5 Basic Conditions of Rural Households 
Item 1990 1995 2000 2008 2009
  Average Number of Permanent Residents 4.80 4.48 4.20 4.01 3.98
    Per Household                       
  Average Number of Full/Semi Labour Force 2.92 2.88 2.76 2.85 2.85
    Per Household
  Average Number of Dependents per Labour Force
     (including the laborer himself or herself) 1.64 1.56 1.52 1.41 1.40
  Per Capita Annual Income                 (yuan)
  Total Income                   990.38 2337.87 3146.21 6700.69 7115.57
        Income from Wages and Salaries                            138.80 353.70 702.30 1853.73 2061.25
        Income from Household Operations                         815.79 1877.42 2251.28 4302.08 4404.01
        Income from Properties 35.79 40.98 45.04 148.08 167.20
        Income from Transfers                                             65.77 147.59 396.79 483.12
  Per Capita Annual Net Income          (yuan) 686.31 1577.74 2253.42 4760.62 5153.17
 Saving deposits per cata (% of net income)    47.0 45.7 67.9 122.0 n.a.
Saving rate (% disposable income) 14.8 16.9 25.9 23.1 22.5
  Composition of Per Capita Annual Consumption
     Expenditure                                                        (%)
      Food 58.8 58.6 49.1 45.5 41.0
      Clothing 7.8 6.9 5.7 5.8 5.8
      Residence 17.3 13.9 15.5 14.5 20.2
      Household Facilities, Articles and Services 5.3 5.2 4.5 4.4 5.1
      Health Care and Medical Services 3.3 3.2 5.2 6.6 7.2
      Transport and Communication 1.4 2.6 5.6 9.6 10.1
      Education, Cultural and Recreation Services 5.4 7.8 11.2 11.6 8.5
      Miscellaneous Goods and Services 0.7 1.8 3.1 2.1 2.1
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2010 and authors’ elaborations. 
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Appendix B: Tables and Figures 
 
Table B1 
1990 2007 1990 2007 1990 2007 Exports Manufacturing 1990 2008 overall annual
China 39.6 52.2 46.2 34.1 41.3 48.5 39.7 34.0 793.5 5970.8 752 11.9
India 22.7 35.2 65.6 54.7 26.9 29.5 21.2 16.3 871.7 2946.5 338 7.0
Indonesia 32.3 29.0 58.9 62.7 39.1 46.8 29.4 27.1 1506.6 3993.7 265 5.6
Korea, Rep. 36.4 30.9 51.7 54.4 41.6 37.1 41.9 27.3 8187.6 27657.8 338 7.0
Thailand 33.8 34.1 56.8 53.7 37.2 44.7 72.7 35.6 2859.2 8086.4 283 5.9
Vietnam 3.3 28.2 84.3 66.7 22.7 41.5 76.9 21.4 651.4 2787.3 428 8.4
Japan 34.1 25.8 52.5 56.3 39.7 29.3 17.6 21.2 18796.9 34129.5 182 3.4
Brazil 21.4 19.3 59.3 60.8 38.7 28.1 13.7 17.4 5181.7 10304.3 199 3.9
Russian Federation 30.3 32.9 48.9 49.9 48.4 37.7 30.3 18.5 9116.5 15922.5 175 3.1
France 21.2 20.3 57.1 56.6 27.1 20.4 26.5 12.3 17267.9 33058.4 191 3.7
Germany 23.1 25.3 57.6 56.7 37.3 30.4 46.9 23.9 18372.6 35373.9 193 3.7
Italy 22.5 21.6 57.3 58.7 32.1 27.5 29.0 18.2 17595.1 31282.6 178 3.2
United Kingdom 18.1 14.9 62.2 64.0 34.1 23.0 26.4 13.3 16319.5 35467.5 217 4.4
United States 16.3 13.2 66.7 70.7 27.9 21.8 12.1 13.7 23063.6 46350.4 201 4.0
High income 22.7 20.6 59.8 61.5 32.5 25.7 28.1 16.8 17992.2 37124.4 206 4.1
Middle income 26.5 31.3 60.1 55.0 37.2 37.4 32.7 21.7 2246.2 6213.5 277 5.8
Low & middle income 25.8 30.8 60.8 55.6 36.5 37.1 32.8 21.4 1998.6 5369.3 269 5.6
Low income 8.1 15.2 79.6 75.0 21.6 28.9 34.2 14.4 607.6 1351.9 223 4.5
Source: World Development Indicators, 2009 and authors' calculations
International comparison of key indicators of overall economic structure and performance
Gross domestic savings (% 
of GDP)
GDP per capita, PPP (current 
international $)
% growth in p.c. GDP (PPP)
Household final 
consumption (% GDP)
Industry, value added (% 
GDP)
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Table B2. Household real disposable income, saving rate and government spending by 
province 
(2006-08 averages) 
Urban Rural Urban Rural
young      
(0-14)












Beijing East 20467 8705 28.3 31.6 12.3 13.3 13.7 3.9 2.0 23.3
Fujian East 14082 4922 29.3 25.5 24.5 13.5 7.4 2.5 1.0 22.9
Guangdong East 16119 5156 20.9 24.2 26.3 10.0 7.9 2.2 1.0 19.1
Hainan East 9826 3405 24.7 32.8 31.2 12.7 16.1 4.3 3.4 41.4
Hebei East 10186 3708 30.2 34.8 22.0 11.6 8.3 2.6 1.7 47.3
Jiangsu East 14298 5745 34.0 27.8 19.3 15.2 7.8 2.2 0.8 18.2
Liaoning East 10974 4276 22.8 28.7 16.2 14.2 13.1 2.7 3.5 33.3
Shandong East 12469 4374 31.8 27.7 20.6 12.9 6.6 2.0 0.9 30.4
Shanghai East 21565 9340 27.6 15.2 10.2 17.8 15.1 3.0 2.4 21.5
Tianjin East 14810 6263 27.8 49.2 14.7 14.5 10.4 2.7 1.7 32.6
Zhejiang East 18277 7378 30.6 17.9 19.4 13.9 7.2 2.6 0.7 15.5
Eastern regions 
average 14825 5752 28.0 28.7 19.7 13.6 10.3 2.8 1.7 27.8
Anhui Central 9918 3104 25.9 21.0 30.2 15.3 13.2 3.7 2.6 35.2
Heilongjiang Central 9038 3650 26.6 23.9 17.0 11.2 13.6 3.4 2.8 45.2
Henan Central 9684 3244 32.3 31.3 28.4 10.9 9.2 2.9 1.8 41.5
Hubei Central 9697 3398 25.6 21.4 21.3 13.4 11.1 3.0 2.5 38.3
Hunan Central 10435 3363 25.7 13.4 23.7 14.5 11.9 3.0 2.8 36.3
Jiangxi Central 9993 3600 31.5 26.1 34.2 12.6 12.9 3.8 2.8 38.9
Jilin Central 9818 3696 24.4 27.6 16.3 11.1 13.9 3.4 3.1 42.0
Shanxi Central 10062 3173 30.4 26.8 26.3 10.1 14.9 3.9 3.1 52.8
Central regions 
average 9831 3404 27.8 23.9 24.7 12.4 12.6 3.4 2.7 41.3
Gansu West 8429 2024 22.5 12.8 29.6 11.0 20.0 6.2 4.8 52.7
Guangxi West 10312 2759 32.2 15.6 32.0 13.3 12.5 4.0 1.8 41.7
Guizhou West 9002 2037 27.1 20.0 41.3 12.6 21.5 7.7 3.2 49.8
Inner Mongolia West 10665 3429 25.3 19.0 20.4 10.5 14.7 3.1 2.5 41.9
Ningxia West 9315 2722 25.2 18.3 33.4 8.9 22.1 5.8 3.4 39.6
Qinghai West 8412 2205 28.0 7.3 31.4 9.6 29.0 6.7 6.8 39.8
Shaanxi West 9606 2349 21.4 3.9 23.8 12.8 15.2 4.3 3.6 51.4
Sichuan West 9199 2966 21.5 22.3 26.9 16.1 15.1 3.5 3.6 35.9
Xinjiang West 8791 2706 24.0 25.0 30.3 9.6 18.2 5.1 2.6 49.9
Yunnan West 9963 2284 29.8 2.0 32.1 10.9 18.4 5.6 3.9 37.9
Western regions 












Government spending                   % 
of regional GDP
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years, and authors’ elaborations.   
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